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Cognitive deficits are very common in Parkinson’s disease particularly for ‘executive functions’associated with
frontal cortico-striatal networks. Previous work has identified deficits in tasks that require attentional control
like task-switching, andreward-based tasks like gambling or reversal learning.However, there is a complex rela-
tionship between the specific cognitive problems faced by an individual patient, their stage of disease and dopa-
minergic treatment.We used a bimodality continuous performance task during fMRI to examine how patients
with Parkinson’s diseaserepresentthe prospect ofreward andswitch between competing taskrules accordingly.
The task-switch was not separately cued but was based on the implicit reward relevance of spatial and verbal
dimensions of successive compound stimuli. Nineteen patients were studied in relative ‘on’ and ‘off’ states,
inducedby dopaminergic medicationwithdrawal (Hoehn and Y ahr stages1^4).Patients were able to successfully
complete the task and establish a bias to one or other dimension in order to gain reward. However the lateral
prefrontal cortex and caudate nucleus showed a non-linear U-shape relationship between motor disease sever-
ity andregionalbrain activation.Dopaminergic treatment led to a shift in this U-shape function, supporting the
hypothesis of differential neurodegeneration in separate motor and cognitive cortico^striato^thalamo^cortical
circuits.In addition, anteriorcingulate activation associated with reward expectation declined with more severe
disease, whereas activation following actual rewards increased with more severe disease.This may facilitate a
change in goal-directed behaviours from deferred predicted rewards to immediate actual rewards, particularly
when on dopaminergic treatment.We discuss the implications for investigation and optimal treatment of this
common condition at different stages of disease.
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Parkinson’s disease is usually regarded as a disorder of
movement, but a third of patients have significant cognitive
problems at presentation, doubling after 4 years (Foltynie
et al., 2004a; Williams-Gray et al., 2007a) and dementia
may be as common as 10% in early stages rising to 80% in
late stages of disease (Galvin et al., 2006; Williams-Gray
et al., 2007a). Such cognitive impairments are a major
determinant of reduced quality of life in Parkinson’s disease
(Schrag et al., 2000) and are a major challenge for treat-
ment of patients. However, the cognitive deficits can appear
complex or contradictory, and we will show how a more
complex model of interactions between disease, cognition
and treatment is needed.
Although many cognitive processes can be affected, the
cognitive syndrome of Parkinson’s disease is often described
as a disorder of frontal executive function (Owen et al.,
1992; Robbins et al., 1994). Two broad categories of
executive functions are usually studied in patients with
Parkinson’s disease. One category includes functions of
attentional control such as working memory, planning and
task- or set-switching. The other category includes reward-
based control of behaviours and the management of risk.
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both categories but the nature of the deficit is not
straightforward. It depends on a complex interaction between
the specific cognitive task components, the severity of disease,
genotype and treatment. For example, patients with mild to
moderate disease are impaired at planning or at switching
from one task to another when medication is withdrawn
(‘off’ state), but they are not impaired on risk-taking
paradigms or probabilistic reversal learning (Morris et al.,
1988; Owen et al., 1990; Swainson et al., 2000; Cools et al.,
2001,2002b,2003;Lewisetal.,2003a;Foltynieetal.,2004a,b).
When treated with dopaminergic agents (‘on’ state) the
planning and task-switching deficits are improved, but
patients become impaired at risk-taking paradigms, gambling
and reversal learning (Molina et al., 2000; Swainson et al.,
2000; Cools et al., 2001, 2003; Brand et al., 2004;
Mimura et al., 2006; Pagonabarraga et al., 2007; Voon
and Fox, 2007).
It is proposed that these two categories of executive
functions, like their motor and oculomotor counterparts,
are mediated by distinct cortico–striato–thalamo–cortical
circuits (Alexander et al., 1990). Such anatomical dissocia-
tions are supported by functional neuroimaging data from
healthy subjects (Rogers et al., 2000; Nagahama et al., 2001;
Cools et al., 2002a; Hampshire and Owen, 2006). In each
circuit there is an optimal level of dopaminergic innerva-
tion, leading to a Yerkes–Dodson type U-shape relationship
between dopaminergic state and neural function (Cools,
2006; Williams-Gray et al., 2008) (Fig. 1). This hypothesis
predicts the impaired performance following cortical
dopaminergic treatment or antagonism away from this
optimum (Brozoski et al., 1979; Arnsten et al., 1994;
Roberts et al., 1994). It has also been shown that in
humans, the separate cortico–subcortical circuits are dif-
ferentially affected by the cortical and subcortical pathology
during the course of Parkinson’s disease(Rinne et al., 2001;
Braak et al., 2006; Wolters and Braak, 2006). On this
basis, we predicted differential and non-linear effects of
Parkinson’s disease on motor and executive functions, at
different stages of the disease (Gotham et al., 1988).
This model also predicts that as the disease progresses,
the optimal states of dopaminergic modulation for different
cortico–cortical circuit functions progressively diverge
(Fig. 1). When sampling across the patient population,
in any given dopaminergic state, the result would be a
different U-shape function relating disease motor-severity
(e.g. UPDRS) to executive function. The optimal dopami-
nergic state to perform the function (indicated by the
centre of the U-shape curve) would be shifted laterally
along the abscissa (x-axis). A similar change would also be
seen when comparing between ‘on’ and ‘off’ states (Fig. 1).
The lateral shift means that dopaminergic treatment that
moves a patient towards their motor optimum may move
the same patient away from their cognitive optimum
(Gotham et al., 1988; Cools et al., 2001, 2003).
Although we have so far stressed the differences between
the executive processes of attentional control and reward-
based behaviour, it is clear that these two processes must
operate together when the appropriate cognitive set depends
on reward or reward expectation. We have previously
Fig. 1 (A) A schematic representation of the relationship
between efficiency of neural functions (y-axis) and the state of
dopaminergic modulation (x-axis).In healthy control subjects there
is aYerkes-Dodson type U-relationship between cognitive/motor
functions and dopaminergic modulation. In Parkinson’s Disease,
there is a rightward shift in the U-shape function along the
abscissa, more so for motor functions, and less so for different
cognitive processes according to the specific underlying cortico-
striatal loop (PFo/AC = orbital and medial prefrontal cortex, PFV
= lateral prefrontal cortex).When sampling across many indivi-
duals in a population in a given dopaminergic state a U-shape
function is therefore also observed (not shown)..These U-shaped
r e l a t i o n s h i p sa l s od e p e n do nt h es t a g eo fd i s e a s e ,a n dC O M T
genotype amongst other factors. (B).The task used a bi-modality
continuous performance task, in which letters were shown at one
of eight radial locations. Sequential letter pairs formed a spatial
target if an‘A’ was followed by a‘X’, called a AX-verbal target trial.
Similarly, a sequential letter pairs formed a verbal target if an‘A ’
was followed by a‘X’, called a AX-verbal target trial. Some trials
were non-targets, although either the first or second stimulus
in the pair may include target relevant information eg a letter at
6 o’clock albeit not followed by a letter at 3 o’clock. (C) The order
of spatial (s), neutral (n) or verbal (v) trial types was permuted
(see methods) and included one, two or three successive target
trials of the same type. If subjects correctly identified three
successive target trials of the same type, they received a reward.
The trial order orthogonalized the time-course of reward
expectation (expected proximity to reward over successive trials)
from the resulting bias towards spatial or verbal task set.
The correlation between reward expectation and actual reward
was greatly reduced by rewarding only trials with three
consecutive targets of the same type, not target pairs or singles.
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reward expectation in young healthy adults (Rowe et al.,
2008) using a bimodality version of the continuous
performance task (AX-CPT) (Beck et al., 1956). We used
this paradigm to study patients with Parkinson’s disease, in
both ‘on’ and ‘off’ states, together with control participants
matched for age, sex and COMT genotype. The experi-
mental design allowed us to characterize the complex
non-linear relationships between Parkinson’s disease, dis-
ease progression, dopaminergic treatment and the inte-
grated neural mechanisms underlying reward representation
and cognitive set transitions. In particular, we tested wheth-
er patients with Parkinson’s disease are able to appro-
priately modulate cognitive set according to reward
expectations—a key feature of goal-directed behaviour.
Our overarching hypothesis is that different cognitive
components are differentially affected as a function of the
stage of disease, with dissociable non-linear (U-shape)
relationships between neural activity (BOLD-fMRI signal)
and disease severity (UPDRS). Furthermore, the effects of
dopaminergic treatment will depend on the task element
and its associated cortico–subcortical circuit. Specifically,
we predicted that (i) patients could perform the task but
that performance would depend on the stage of disease and
dopaminergic treatment in a non-linear manner, (ii) that
cortical and subcortical activations associated with task
performance would depend on the stage of disease and
dopaminergic treatment, with displacement of the dose
response curve within prefrontal cortico–subcortical regions
but no change for motor regions, (iii) that the rostral
anterior cingulate would be associated with reward
expectation and (iv) that reward expectation would lead
to specific patterns of modality-specific cortical activation
reflecting the induced cognitive bias.
Methods
Subjects
Nineteen patients with idiopathic Parkinson’s disease were
recruited from the Cambridge Centre for Brain Repair’s
Parkinson’s disease research clinic. Inclusion criteria were: IPD
according to UK Parkinson’s Disease Society Brain Bank clinical
diagnostic criteria; age 50–80 years; heterozygote for the COMT
val158met polymorphism; on dopaminergic medication; no
current depressive illness; no known dementia based on prior
cognitive assessment; Hoehn and Yahr stages 2 or 3at last clinic
visit. Exclusion criteria included incompatibility with MRI and
adverse reactions to withdrawal or delay of dopaminergic
medication. The patients’ details are given in Table 1.
Patients were scanned on two occasions, at a similar time of
day. On one day they took their normal medication and were in a
relative ‘on’ state. On the other occasion they stopped medication
prior to the examination to induce a relative and clearly defined
‘off’ state. Just as ‘on’ patients may not be maximally ‘on’, so the
‘off’ state is not as great as could have been achieved by prolonged
withdrawal. However, the withdrawal period was sufficient to
induce a clinically significant relative ‘off’ state (Table 1).
Nonetheless, the range of UPDRS values across subjects over-
lapped considerably between ‘on’ and ‘off’ states. The order of ‘on’
and ‘off’ sessions was counterbalanced and randomly permuted
within each sequential group of six recruits. Participants were
asked to stop short acting dopaminergic medications (standard
preparations of l-dopa and short acting dopamine agonists) at
least 12h before scanning (mean 18h, SD 3.5), and long acting
preparations (cabergoline, control release preparations of l-dopa)
at least 24h before scanning (mean 24h, SD 9.8). Several patients
were taking dopamine agonists alone or in combination with
L-dopa.
Nineteen healthy subjects were recruited from the same
database of COMT heterozygotes, aged 50–80 years, with no
current neurological or psychiatric history and no contraindica-
tions to MRI. One subject had extensive idiopathic calcification of
the basal ganglia and was removed from the analysis of fMRI data
and another had hydrocephalus and was removed from sub-
sequent analysis. Control subjects were scanned twice, and
randomly assigned to a nominal ‘on’ or ‘off’ session, to balance
for session effects including practice. The nominal ‘on’ and ‘off’
days were analysed separately, as for patients, in a pseudo-factorial
design. However, control subjects were not treated with L-dopa.
All participants gave written informed consent according to the
1991 Declaration of Helsinki. The study was given a favourable
opinion by the local research ethics committee. Prior to scanning,
all patients were examined according to the UPDRS motor rating
scale (Fahn et al., 1987) and classified with the Hoehn and Yahr
(1967) and Schwab and England (1969) scales. After scanning on
the ‘on’ day, all subjects completed the MMSE (Folstein et al.,
1975), verbal fluency tests for letter (p) and category (animals)
and the NART (Nelson, 1982). Patients also completed the Beck
Depression Inventory II (Psychological Corporation, Boston, MA)
and 16/18 completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur
and Blume, 1987). None endorsed any indices of pathological
gambling, nor were any subjects currently depressed.
Behavioural tasks
The task details have been published previously with young
healthy adults (Rowe et al., 2008). It was based on the AX-
continuous performance task (Beck et al., 1956; Braver et al.,
1999), but included letter stimuli that were defined both by their
spatial location (eight positions, in a circle) and verbal letter
identity (one of eight capital letters). Stimuli were presented
sequentially as pairs forming a single trial. In each pair the first
letter was the pre-cue and the second letter was the response cue.
Each letter was presented for 500ms, with an interval between
letters in each trial of 900ms. Trial onset asynchrony was 3500ms.
Target trials were trials in which both the pre-cue and the
response-cue were associated with targets and reward. Spatial
targets were trials in which the first letter of the pair appeared at
6 o’clock and the second letter appeared at 3 o’clock. Verbal
targets were trials in which the first letter was an ‘A’ and the
second was an ‘X’. A double target trial (i.e. an A at 6 o’clock
followed by an X at 3 o’clock) was never presented, although trials
could include ambiguous cues (e.g. an A at 6 o’clock or an X at 3
o’clock). The spatial and verbal trial types are formally similar. For
ease of reference, all target pre-cues (spatial and verbal) are
denoted as ‘A’, and all target response cues are denoted as ‘X’. All
other pre-cues that are not targets, and thus are neutral cues, are
collectively known as ‘B’. Similarly all other response-cues that are
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stimuli that make up a trial give rise to four formal trial types:
AX, AY, BX, BY, suffixed with the appropriate dimension (spatial,
verbal or neutral) (see Fig. 1 for details). Overall, 33% were spatial
targets (AXspatial), 33% were verbal targets (AXverbal) and 33% of
trials were not targets (non-AXspatial non-AXverbal).
Target trials for one dimension can also be defined indepen-
dently in the other dimension, according to the type of pre- or
response-cues in other non-target dimension. For example in a
spatial target trial the pre-cue at 6 o’clock could be an A, which is
also a target-relevant cue for the verbal dimension. Formally,
the context of the other dimension is denoted by three forms:
AY, BX, BY, where A and B refer to the pre-cue and X and Y
refer to response cue. For example a spatial target trial containing
an A at 6o’clock, followed by a T at 3 o’clock would be
defined as an AXspatial AYverbal trial. Other examples are given
in Fig. 1.
Subjects indicated whether a trial was a target or non-target by
pressing their right index or middle finger, respectively. An
audible click acknowledged their correct button press. Subjects
were instructed that successful detection of three sequential targets
within a given dimension would lead to a monetary bonus
(10 pence bonus, paid after scanning) and a salient cash-register
sound (‘ka-ching’). This induces an incremental shift or bias to
one or other dimension, as a subject successfully identifies a series
of targets. The shift is orthogonal to the expectation of reward
that rises over successive targets (Fig. 1C).
The presentation of data was controlled using Cogent 2000
software (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent2000) using Matlab 7.1
(www.mathworks.com) in Windows XP (www.microsoft.com).
Reaction time to presentation of the second stimulus and the
accuracy of target detection were recorded. RT and arcsin-
transformed accuracies were analysed in SPSS 11.0 (SPSS Inc.,
Chicago). Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed both on
the arcsin-transformed accuracy values and RT data. For the
ANOVAs, treatment assignment (‘on’ versus ‘off’), sequential
target repetitions (non-target, first AX, second AX, third AX) and
trial type (AX–BY, AX–BX, AX–AY) for each dimension (spatial
and verbal) were within-subject variables. Patient versus control
group was a between-subjects variable. Since control subjects were
assigned to a nominal treatment category, but not given
dopaminergic medication, an effect of medication in Parkinson’s
Table 1 Demographic and drug details of PD Patients and controls
No Sex Age Sw-
En
HY
Off
HY
On
UPDRS
Off
UPDRS
On
Year s
(diagnosis)
L-dopa
mg/d
L-dopa
equivalent
1
Nart
error
Predicted
FullScale
IQ
MM
SE
Fluency Medications (mg)
PA n i m a l s A C R E O t h e r
1 F 53 80 2 2 24 14 8.7 900 2200 6 123 30 20 28 100 21
2 M 61 70 4 2 53 17 15.4 2200 2585 5 124 30 24 24 300 T 300
3 M 78 80 4 3 50 30 13.5 700 512 29 104 25 13 20 O120
4 F 65 100 2 2 12 7 5.0 250 1090 30 103 30 17 24 21 O 50, D 30
5 M 65 70 2.5 2.5 36 19 13.5 700 1196 36 98 27 22 25 800 S10
6 F 50 90 2.5 2 34 15 9.5 300 1200 27 105 27 1 1 19 200 15
7 F 78 90 2 1 14 1 5.7 600 600 28 105 29 12 17
8 M 64 90 2 2 20 17 3.0 400 1290 5 124 30 19 28 100 P 2.1
9 M 69 80 2 2 29 18 4.8 400 1 120 45 91 29 10 19 4 S1.25
10 F 65 90 3 2.5 38 30 4.6 600 1560 32 101 27 6 20 24
1 1 M 59 80 2.5 2 36 29 5.7 500 1140 13 1 17 30 23 24 200 4
12 F 59 70 2.5 2 34 31 5.5 300 1260 12 118 30 31 35 6
13 M 68 80 2.5 2 32 20 9.0 250 915 33 100 28 9 11 4 S 5
14 M 66 80 2.5 2 33 25 6.9 800 1009 37 97 26 1 1 16 200 1 600
15 F 75 80 2.5 2 34 26 10.7 1200 1745 2 127 27 23 17 200 18 800
16 F 62 90 3 1 26 10 5.4 500 1020 42 93 29 21 12 18 600
17 M 62 100 2.5 2 30 19 5.2 800 1640 42 93 28 8 24 100 P1
18
 M7 57 0 32 3 2 2 2 5 . 6 1 3 0 0 1 4 7 5 1 5 1 1 52 61 8 1 6 9
19
 M 63 70 2.5 2 39 14 10.1 600 1680 12 1 18 29 12 24 200 24 800
Patients
11m Mean 65.1 82.1 2.6 2.0 31.9 19.2 7.8 700.0 1328.3 23.7 108.2 28.3 16.3 21.2
8f SD 7 .7 9.8 0.4 0.5 10.2 8.2 3.5 467 .6 502.7 14.2 11.9 1.6 6.7 5.9
Controls
8 m Mean 67.4 14 116 29.1 16.1 21.8
9f SD 6.1 7.2 6 0.8 4.6 5
1Equivalent levodopa dose=[levodopa ( 1.2 if COMT inhibitor)( 1.2 if 10 mg of S or 1.1 if 5 mg of S)] + [P 400]+ [R40]+
[C160]+ [pergolide200]+[bromocriptine 10]+[lisuride160]; all doses are in milligrams. [Williams Gray C. J Neurosci 2007
27 4832^38].
arachnoid cyst, excluded from imaging analysis, SwEn=Schwab and England; H Y=Hoehn and Yahr; UDPRS=Unified
Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale motor subscale III; MMSE=Folstein Mini-Mental State Examination; NART=national adult reading test
estimate of premorbid IQ.
dyskinetic ‘on’, excluded from imaging analysis. Other drugs as mg/day are: A=amantadine; C=Cabergoline;
R=Ropinirole; E=entacapone;T=tolcapone; S=selegiline; P=pramipexole; O=orphenadrine, D=domperidone.
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subject variables, or as a simple main effect of medication within
the patient group. We retain the division of control subjects
into their assigned nominal treatment, to retain a pseudo-
factorial design with a priori identity between the control subject
cells. Any difference between control subjects’ cells would
indicate either noise or biased distribution of other effects, such
as fatigue.
MRI data acquisition and analysis
fMRI data acquisition, pre-processing and analysis of subject-
specific effects at the first level were the same as previously
published, and outlined in supplementary material (Rowe et al.,
2008). Second level models (random effects) for each contrast
of interest were made using an ANOVA of the contrast images
from each subject’s analysis at the first level, correcting for non-
sphericity assuming inequality of variance between groups and
sessions, and non-independence of error terms. The non-
sphericity correction estimates hyperparameters for the different
error variance and covariance terms using a maximum likelihood
procedure, pooling across voxels that exceed an omnibus F-test of
the effects of all conditions at P50.001 (in effect, weighting the
estimation to grey matter voxels). Based on this estimate of non-
sphericity, the statistics are adjusted when making statistical
inferences.
The second level ANOVAs had a similar design for each
contrast of interest. They included four separate regressors (0/1)
specifying each group for each session (patient ‘off’, patient ‘on’,
control ‘off’, control ‘on’). In addition, there were two regressors
specifying the mean corrected UPDRS within each session for
patients (UPDRS-off, UPDRS-on) and two regressors specifying
the square of the mean-corrected UPDRS (UPDRS-sq-off,
UPDRS-sq-on). This enables an assessment of linear, quadratic
or compound effects of UPDRS on regional neuronal activation
for any given contrast. SPM{t} maps were generated using
t-contrasts for example to assess the averaged effects across all
subjects for a contrast (e.g. [1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0]) or the difference
between patient and control groups (e.g. [1 1 –1 –1 0 0 0 0]).
F-contrasts were used to assess whether for example activations
differed between groups and/or between ‘on’ and ‘off’ l-dopa (e.g.
[1 –1 0 0 0 0 0 0; 0 1 –0.5 –0.5 0 0 0 0]); or whether there was a
linear and/or quadratic effect of UPDRS on regional brain
activation (e.g. [0 00010– 10 ;0000010–1]).
SPMs were thresholded such that the familywise error rate was
P50.05 corrected for whole brain comparisons using Gaussian
Random Field Theory. In view of the hypotheses regarding specific
effects, we also corrected for multiple comparisons within
specified regions of interest (20mm radius spherical ROIs). The
centre of ROIs are drawn for the peak foci from equivalent
contrasts in a separate group of younger subjects without
Parkinson’s disease (Rowe et al., 2008) or an independent contrast
in the current dataset. They are centred on fronto-polar cortex
(–42,52,–4), caudate nuclei (0,15,4) substantia nigra (–4,–24,
–12), anterior cingulate (6,26,14) and Broca’s area (–54,34,0).
The use of ROIs is indicated in parenthesis in the ‘Results’ section.
Where ROIs are used, we report statistical inferences with
correction for multiple comparisons within the ROI, but also
inferences corrected for whole brain comparisons and without
correction.
Results
Behavioural results
Patients could perform the task despite its apparent
complexity, even those in a severe ‘off’ state. There was
evidence for graded cognitive set shift towards reward-
relevant dimensions (Figs 2 and S1). The additional effects
of disease severity on behavioural indices are detailed in
supplementary online material.
For spatial and verbal targets, RT reduced with successive
targets [spatial: F(3,99)=39, P50.001, verbal: F(3,99)=56,
P50.001] and was overall faster for patients [spatial:
F(1,33)=5, P50.05, verbal: F(1,33)=5, P50.05, Fig. 2].
RT for spatial or verbal targets depended also on the
context, defined by the non-target verbal or spatial
dimension, respectively. Responses were slower when a
misleading pre-cue was give i.e. AY trials (an A at 6o’clock)
versus BX trials (an X at 3 o’clock) or BY trials (neither A
nor X) trials [spatial: F(2,66)=83, P50.001, verbal:
F(2,66)=97, P50.001, Supplementary Figure S1]. There
was a significant interaction between the number of target
repetitions (first AX, second AX, third AX) and the context
defined by the non-target trial type (AY, BY, BX) indicating
an increase in the specificity of attention to the spatial
Fig. 2 (A)R e a c t i o nt i m e( R T )t ot r i a l sf o rs p a t i a l( g r e y )a n d
verbal (black) target trials, for first, second and third successive
target trials. Although patients were overall faster than controls,
both groups showed faster reaction times across successive target
trials. (B) Arc-sin accuracy (cf. error rates) to target trials,
separately for spatial (grey) and verbal (black) target trials,
for first, second and third target trials. Although patients were
overall less accurate than controls, both groups showed enhanced
accuracy across successive target trials.‘On’ versus ‘off’effects are
shown in Supplementary Fig. S1e and f.
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P50.001, verbal: F(6,198)=15, P50.001]. Thus, when a
spatial target trial had not been preceded by previous
spatial trials, RT was slower when the pre-cue cued both
the spatial and verbal dimensions compared to when the
pre-cue was neutral. However, with successive spatial
targets the effect of the pre-cue in the verbal dimension
diminished. There were no other significant interactions
among groups, target, context or medication or high-order
interactions among these factors for spatial or verbal trials.
Control subjects were more accurate than patients in
both dimensions [spatial: F(1,34)=5.7, P50.05, verbal:
F(1,34)=6.1, P50.05, Figs 2 and S1]. Accuracy improved
with successive targets for both dimensions [spatial:
F(1,102)=6, P50.001; verbal: F(1,102)=4.5, P50.05,
Fig. 2]. Accuracy varied with the non-target context for
the verbal dimension only [verbal: F(2,68)=5, P50.05;
spatial: F(2,68)=1, ns, Supplementary Figure S1]. For
verbal targets, being ‘off’ in the patient group exaggerated
the effect of successive targets on accuracy in patients
[significant three-way interaction between medication,
group and targets, F(3,102)=5.3, P50.01, with higher
errors made on neutral trials and fewer errors on the first
verbal targets, see Supplementary Figure S1]. There were no
other significant interactions among groups, target, context
or medication or high-order interactions among these
factors.
Neuroimaging results
The performance of the AX-CPT task (versus baseline, FEW
P50.05) was associated with activation of an extensive
network of cortical regions bilaterally, including dorsal
prefrontal cortex, SMA, pre-SMA, superior frontal sulci,
parietal and intraparietal cortex, prestriate and fusiform
cortex. There was unilateral activation of left motor and
premotor cortex, left inferior frontal gyrus and right
cerebellum (Supplementary Table ST1).
The motor severity of disease, as assessed by the UPDRS,
was associated with significant positive non-linear differ-
ences in activation related to task performance in three
regions: left fronto-polar cortex [–30, 48, –2, F(4,58)=8.96:
FWE P50.05 within ROI, FWE P=0.07 whole brain
corrected, P50.001 unc], the caudate nucleus [8, 10, 4,
F(4,58)=6.49: FWE=0.05 within ROI, FWE P40.1 whole
brain corrected, P50.001 unc] and left substantia nigra
[–8, –18, –20, F(4,58)=5.67: FWE P=0.05 within ROI,
FWE P40.1 whole brain corrected, P50.001 unc]. In these
regions (Fig 3A and B), there are non-linear functions
relating BOLD response to UPDRS. This function is
shifted leftwards along the abscissa with dopaminergic
treatment.
The motor severity of disease was also associated with
significant negative non-linear differences in activation in
two regions that were not on average activated with task
performance (all subjects contrast of task versus baseline).
These were the left frontal operculum [–42, 26, –12,
F(4,58)=10.68, FWE P50.05] where all groups deactivated
during task performance; and ventral striatum [–4, 20, –6,
F(4,58)=9.77, FWE P50.05] in which ‘on’ patients showed
deactivation with increased UPDRS, but ‘off’ patients
showed deactivation early in disease, crossing over at a
point of deactivation at UPDRS 25. Control subjects had
non-significant trend towards deactivation at this location.
The magnitude of the lateral shift (along the abscissa) of
the U-shaped BOLD-UPDRS function between ‘on’ and
‘off’ states was calculated for all voxels. In Fig. 4, it is
plotted for all voxels (top panel), and sampled from cortex
at 10mm rostro-caudal intervals in the parasaggital planes
of y=–30 and y=–40 (lower panel). It can clearly be seen
that there is minimal shift in primary sensorimotor cortex
and medial prefrontal cortex. In contrast, the lateral
prefrontal cortex and parietal association cortex have a
lateral shift reaching 40 UPDRS points. This shift pertains
to a combination of the sensory, motor, attentional and
executive components associated with the principal task
covariate. The contributory cognitive processes may vary
between locations.
The expectation of reward was associated with activation
of the anterior cingulate (6, 26, 14 t=3.8, FWE P50.05
within ROI, FWE P40.1 whole brain corrected, P50.001
unc]. Increasing bias toward the spatial dimension,
orthogonal to the expectation of reward, was associated
with activation of occipital prestriate cortex (18,–72,–6,
t=5.28, FWE P50.05). Bias towards the verbal dimension
did not elicit significantly different responses, at FWE
P50.05 (whole brain or within the ROI centred on Broca’s
area).
The severity of disease also influenced BOLD responses to
reward expectation in the anterior cingulate [Fig. 3C, peak 2,
18, 22, F(4,58)=6.48, FWE P50.05 within ROI, FWE P40.1
whole brain corrected, P50.001unc] (F-contrast of effects
of linear and quadratic UPDRS covariates on reward expec-
tation contrast images, with inclusive masking of activation
associated with reward expectation, P50.05 unc). Interest-
ingly, as can be seen from the data plots in Fig. 3E(iii), the
anterior cingulate regions showed a decline in activation with
higher disease severity.
An opposite effect of motor severity of disease (UPDRS)
was observed on the BOLD response to actual reward, in
the anterior cingulate [4, 16, 22, F(4,58)=10.3, FWE
P50.05 within ROI, FWE P=0.05 whole brain corrected,
P50.001 unc] as shown in Fig. 3D and E(iv). Subjects with
more severe disease, in both ‘on’ and ‘off’ states, show
increasing BOLD response on trials which were actually
rewarded (as opposed to those on which rewards were
expected).
Discussion
The key findings of this study in relation to our hypotheses
are that (i) patients can modulate cognitive set according to
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‘off’ states, despite previous reports of impaired task
switching; (ii) cortical and subcortical activations associated
with task performance depend in a non-linear manner on
the severity of disease and dopaminergic treatment (iii) the
anterior cingulate cortex is associated with reward expecta-
tion, less so in patients with more severe disease and (iv)
reward expectation leads to specific patterns of modality-
specific cortical activation, reflecting induced cognitive bias.
Behavioural effects of Parkinson’s disease
Patients were overall quicker than control subjects. Given
the bradykinesia of Parkinson’s disease, this may seem
paradoxical. However, faster reaction times by Parkinson’s
disease patients ‘off’ versus ‘on’ or in comparison with
control subjects has been described previously in several
cognitive paradigms (Cools et al., 2002b; Mattay et al.,
2002; Frank et al., 2007). The shorter reaction times may
result from the loss of conflict or response monitoring even
in the presence of bradykinesia.
Patients with Parkinson’s disease have previously been
reported to be impaired at task switching in ‘off’ states
(Fimm et al., 1994; Cools et al., 2001, 2003). We did not
find this deficit, either ‘on’ or ‘off’ medication. There are
several possibilities for why our patients did not show a
deficit for set-shifting. First, that the critical process that is
impaired in Parkinson’s disease is only required for a subset
of task-shift paradigms e.g. when the shift-cost depends on
the events of the previous trial (Astle et al., 2006) or the
predictability of future events (Swainson et al., 2006).
Second, the set transitions in our study did not depend on
negative feedback. Patients with mild disease may be poor
at set shifting because of disordered cortical and subcortical
responses to negative feedback (Monchi et al., 2004, 2006,
2007) and are largely unaffected on cued set-shift tasks
without negative feedback (Rogers et al., 1998; Ravizza and
Ciranni, 2002). Third, it may be that the preserved set-
transitions in our task are due to the incremental bias
towards one dimension or the other rather than large or
dichotomous transitions in set. Finally, it is possible that
the previous set-shifting deficits reflect a goal-neglect for
externally cued tasks changes. Such goal-neglect is a
feature of impaired frontal lobe function following
lesions (Duncan et al., 1996) and might in principle be
part of the ‘dysexecutive’ cognitive syndrome of Parkinson’s
disease.
The contribution of functional neuroimaging
The fMRI data confirm that trial performance was
associated with a wide network of cortical and subcortical
areas. The breadth of this network reflects the complexity of
each trial, requiring motor responses based on judgements
of compound visual stimuli according to spatial and lexical
information. In contrast to many previous studies, we did
not find a simple group difference in terms of task-related
regional BOLD activation, however, there were significant
non-linear differences according to the UPDRS, in both
‘on’ and ‘off’ states (Fig. 3).
The BOLD–UDPRS relationship may reflect changes in
neural efficiency (the degree of activation associated with
similar performance). It has been reported to be reduced in
Parkinson’s disease in motor and working memory tasks
(Haslinger et al., 2001; Mattay et al., 2002) and increased in
other working memory and planning tasks (Lewis et al.,
2003b; Williams-Gray et al., 2007b). Critically, the changes
in neuronal efficiency may depend on the extent to
which the task is modulated by cortical dopamine.
Fluorodopa PET scanning suggests that medial and lateral
prefrontal cortical dopaminergic system are up-regulated
in early Parkinson’s disease (Rakshi et al., 1999; Kaasinen
et al., 2001; Nagano-Saito et al., 2004) but not late disease
(Rakshi et al., 1999; Rinne et al., 2000). This implies early
frontal compensation for striatal dopaminergic deficiency,
by enhancing neuronal efficiency for the task. Direct
evidence comes from a combined fluorodopa-PET and
FDG-PET study in Parkinson’s disease patients tested
during performance of Raven’s Matrices task: the enhanced
fluoro-DOPA uptake was associated with a fall in anterior
cingulate glucose metabolism for similar performance
(Nagano-Saito et al., 2004).
Why should the effects of dopamine depletion or
treatment lead to non-linear, U-shaped relationships with
performance or neural activation? Cools’ comprehensive
synthesis of animal and human data suggests that the
optimum dopaminergic state depends on a cognitive task’s
competing requirements for cognitive plasticity—to update,
adapt or switch neural representations of rules, events or
actions—and the need for cognitive stability of representa-
tions over time, especially in the face of interference
between trials or distraction within trials (Cools, 2006).
A plausible cellular mechanism is provided by the dif-
ferential distribution of D1 and D2 receptors in prefrontal
cortex and striatum (Camps et al., 1990) and the time- and
concentration-dependent opposing effects D1 and D2 sti-
mulation (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002; Lapish et al.,
2007). The result is that both dopamine deficiency and
over-dose affect performance, but that the mechanism of
impairment differs.
The AX-CPT task requires cognitive control to update
and maintain trial-specific information (Braver et al., 1999).
Our paradigm also required set-bias to one or other
stimulus dimension. These processes of cognitive control
contribute to the activation of prefrontal cortical during the
task (Rowe et al., 2008). A critical role of dopamine in
modulating control by prefrontal cortex during the
AX-CPT was demonstrated in earlier computational and
clinical models (Braver et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2002). Our
analysis confirms dopamine dependence of the prefrontal
cortex in these control processes, rather than the spe-
cific induced biases to spatial or verbal dimensions. More-
over, the caudate nucleus to which our lateral prefrontal
2100 Brain (2008),131,2 0 9 4^ 2 1 0 5 J .B .R o w eet al.cortex ROI projects (Calzavara et al., 2007; Leh et al., 2007)
showed a similar non-linear relationship between UPDRS
and BOLD response, emphasizing the cortico–striatal
circuits underlying task performance.
In terms of these fronto-striatal activations a UPDRS
of 10 in the ‘on’ state is very different from a UPDRS
of 10 in the ‘off’ state. The ‘on’ BOLD–UPDRS curve is
shifted to the left of the ‘off’ curve (along the abscissa).
This is expected if the dopaminergic treatment changes
an index of disease severity that is relevant to the
motor system, but not the cognitive systems (Fig. 1A
and B). The greater the difference between the motor
cortico–subcortical network and the cortico–subcortical
network mediating another function (cognitive, affective,
oculomotor, etc) the greater the expected shift. In Fig. 4 the
shift is minimal around the central sulcus and inferior
Fig. 3 SPM(F) maps indicating that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (A) and caudate nucleus (B) show differential activation with
disease severity for activity associated with task performance. (C) SPM(F) map of the anterior cingulate cortex, with a significant effect
of UPDRS on the activations associated with expectation of reward across successive trials. (D) SPM(F) map of regions with a significant
effect of UPDRS on the activation in response to actual receipt of rewards including a peak in anterior cingulate cortex extending into
medial frontal cortex. For the prefrontal, caudate and cingulate foci shown in A^D, the adjusted BOLD response (% BOLD signal change)
to each trial type is plotted against the UPDRS in Ei to Eiv respectively. Control subjects responses are indicated by black ticks on the
y-axis,‘on’patients shown in red and ‘off’patients shown in blue.Note the difference between blue‘off’and red ‘on’curves.Lines show best
least squares quadratic fits. A contrast relying on a simple contrast of patient vs control would have missed the effects of Parkinson’s
disease at different stages of disease.
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parietal cortex, consistent with regional differences in
neuropathological progression (Braak et al., 2006).
Reward and reward expectation
We specifically distinguished reward and reward expecta-
tion from other cognitive and motor aspects of the task,
because of their association with central dopaminergic
systems. Increasing reward expectancy over successive trials
was associated with activation of the anterior cingulate
cortex, consonant with animal electrophysiology (Shidara
and Richmond, 2002, 2004) and neuroimaging of healthy
adults (O’Doherty et al., 2001, 2003; Schott et al., 2007;
Rowe et al., 2008). There was no significant main effect of
patient group on activation related to reward-expectation in
the anterior cingulate, but there was again an effect of
disease severity (Fig. 3). In both ‘on’ and ‘off’ states, there
is a fall in activation associated with reward expectancy
with more severe disease. This means that patients with
more advanced disease are failing to respond to the
proximity of reward, in terms of ACC neural representation
of reward. Behaviourally, this is seen in the negative
correlation between UPDRS and the expectancy effect on
RT (in ‘on’ state) and expectancy effect on accuracy
(Fig. S2cd).
However, the patients are not insensitive to reward per se.
Patients with more advanced disease show increased
activation in anterior cingulate regions (Fig. 3), in both
‘on’ and ‘off’ states. Increased activation in ACC in
response to expected rewards has been noted in early
unmedicated Parkinson’s disease patients (Schott et al.,
2007) but our data show that this effect is seen in early and
middle-stage disease, both ‘on’ and ‘off’ medication.
Considering Fig. 3C and D together it seems that as disease
progresses, reward-related activations in ACC change to the
actual receipt of reward rather than anticipated reward.
This might contribute to the apathy sometimes associated
with Parkinson’s disease (Czernecki et al., 2002).
The failure to represent and behave according to
anticipated reward but to remain sensitive to actual
reward resembles the dopamine-dependant processes of
early learning. Dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain,
projecting to the striatum and medial frontal cortex
respond to received reward prior to learning, but less so
as rewards are better predicted. Instead, they become
responsive to events that reliably predict reward (Hollerman
et al., 2000; Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Schultz, 2002).
Our results suggest that patients with more severe
Parkinson’s disease are less able to adapt the function of
the cingulate-striatal reward system from representation of
actual reward to representation of expected reward.
Similarly in healthy humans, dopaminergic antagonism by
haloperidol impairs learning to predict reward, relative to
L-dopa treatment (Pessiglione et al., 2006).
Limitations of the study
There are a number of limitations to the current study.
Whilst there is no doubt that for some cognitive functions
prefrontal cortical dopamine is essential (Brozoski et al.,
1979) or detrimental (Arnsten et al., 1994) fMRI studies are
not able to distinguish the relative contributions of cortical
and subcortical dopamine depletion to abnormal behaviour.
It is useful to exploit the functional polymorphisms of the
COMT gene that alter the balance between cortical and
subcortical dopamine and affect performance and activation
on executive tasks (Egan et al., 2001; Foltynie et al., 2004b;
Winterer et al., 2006; Williams-Gray et al., 2007b).
However, for practical reasons we were not able to study
Fig. 4 (A) The peak or nadir of the U-shaped function
between BOLD response and the UPDRS is different between
‘on’ and ‘off’ states.This is seen in figure 3E as a lateral shift along
the x-axis. It is not a shift in anatomical location of the
BOLD-UPDRS function.The magnitude of the difference
between‘on’ and ‘off’conditions is shown for all voxels,
illustrated from above. Note the minimal shift (purple) of
BOLD-UPDRS around the central sulci (dashed line) and medial
prefrontal cortex, but a significant shift in parietal and lateral
prefrontal cortex (positive values indicate that the peak/nadir
of the U-shape function is at a higher UPDRS value in the‘off’
state). (B) The shift in the BOLD-UPDRS relationship
(expressed in UPDRS points at each voxel) has been plotted
for cortical voxels along the rostro-caudal x axis at10mm
intervals in the planes of x=30 (dotted lines, cf figure 3A) and
x=40 (solidline).
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independent factor in this study.
Our main therapeutic manipulation was of dopaminergic
transmission. However, dopamine is just one of many
neurotransmitter systems that are severely impaired in
Parkinson’s disease e.g. noradrenaline, serotonin, acetylcho-
line. Moreover, different dopaminergic therapies have
differential effects on receptor subtypes (Gerlach et al.,
2003; Glickstein et al., 2005). Therefore our treatment
and withdrawals would not have been equivalent across all
patients. In addition, two of our patients used pramipexole,
the dopamine agonist most associated with pathological
gambling (Voon and Fox, 2007) perhaps related to its
greater affinity for D3 receptors. Although none of our
subjects exhibited pathological gambling, subtler effects may
have been present due to dopamine agonists in terms of the
response to reward expectation and reward.
Finally, one must consider whether the dopaminergic
treatment has a direct effect on the prefrontal BOLD fMRI
response because of vasoactive afferents from dopaminergic
neurons (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Krimer et al.,
1998). Fortunately, BOLD-fMRI designs of the type
used here are relatively protected from tonic vasoactive
effects of oral dopaminergic drugs for several reasons.
First, the modelling uses a high-pass filter that removes
the effects of slow drifts in the BOLD signal. Second, one
identifies regionally specific foci of differential activation.
These foci are much smaller than the region of dopami-
nergic vascular innervation, and therefore unlikely to
arise from a global change in BOLD sensitivity caused
by dopaminergic treatment. More specifically, only some
task-functions are sensitive to the effects of treatment,
which again argues against a non-selective effect on the
BOLD response. Nonetheless, an interaction between dopa-
minergic vasoconstriction and the neuroimaging indices of
activation must remain a caveat in fMRI studies with
L-dopa.
Conclusion
In Parkinson’s disease the prefrontal cortex and caudate
have a non-linear relationship between disease severity and
activation. This U-shape function changed with dopami-
nergic treatment, suggesting differential disease progression
and/or compensation in the neural substrates of movement
and cognition. Our results have implications for both
clinical management and future studies of Parkinson’s
disease. Treatments aimed at optimization of motor func-
tion may push non-motor systems beyond their optimal
dose-response curve, especially if non-selective dopaminer-
gic therapies are used. However, studies of simple group
differences, or of linear relationships with disease severity,
are at risk of missing the effects of disease or treatment,
unless they sample patients from one section of the
U-shape curve.
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Supplementary material is available at Brain online.
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